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CLASS ACTIONS UNDER RULE 23(b) (2): A TYPE OF
CLASS ACTION WHICH DOES NOT
REQUIRE EISEN NOTICE
I. INTRODUCTIONC LASS ACTION LITIGATION IN RECENT YEARS has often focused on
whether absent members of the class must be notified of the pen-
dency of the action at the outset of the suit. Since 1966, when Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended, the notice contro-
versy has filled volumes of articles, commentaries and judicial opin-
ions. This question of pretrial notice becomes most crucial in the
disposition of the suit when the class is extremely large, or when the fi-
nancial resources of the person responsible for notifying the class is lim-
ited. In either case, a strict rule which makes expensive notice manda-
tory may effectively dispose of the suit without ever having reached the
merits of the complaint.
Such a strict mandatory notice rule now requires that individual no-
ice be given to all absent class members in actions brought in the federal
courts under Rule 23(b) (3). Most practitioners are aware of this rule as
it was mandated in the recent Supreme Court decision of Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin.1 Many practitioners, however, are apparently unaware that
such pretrial notice is not required in other types of class actions (i.e.,
other than the (b) (3) type). Specifically, many are unaware that the
majority of courts which have examined the notice requirements of class
actions maintained under Rule 23(b) (2) seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief have reached the conclusion that individual pretrial notice is not re-
quired.
This comment will address the subject of class actions under Federal
Rule 23(b) (2) and will trace the development of notice requirements,
taking note of the split of authority on the issue. The holding and the de-
ceivingly broad language of the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen will
also be examined in order to illustrate its lack of effect on the (b) (2)
notice requirements that have developed in the lower courts.
A. Class Actions Under the Amended Rule 23
Under amended Rule 23, a suit may be maintained as a class action if,
first, it meets the four prerequisites enumerated in Rule 23(a).2 These
prerequisites require that: (1) the class be numerous; (2) there be a com-
monality of issues; (3) the representatives be typical of the class; and, (4)
"the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
1417 U.S. 156 (1974) (alternatively known as Eisen IV). For a complete case history of
all the Eisen decisions see note 26 infra.
2FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
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of the class.."3  Upon satisfying these prerequisites, a suit may be certi-
fied as a class action if, in addition, it qualifies under one of the three
types of class actions listed in Rule 23(b) - i.e., subdivision (b) (1), (b) (2),
or (b) (3).4
It has generally been recognized when considering the three types of
class actions defined in Rule 23(b) that only certain types of suits qualify
under subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2), and thus the application of these
two subdivisions is more restricted than that permitted under subdivi-
sion (b) (3).5 For example, the subdivision (b) (1) class action is limited
to cases in which there is a chance of inconsistent adjudication among the
parties if the suit is not maintained as a class action, or to cases in which
disposition of the suit as an individual action would prejudice the rights
of absent class members if they were not made parties to the adjudica-
tion. Similarly, application of subdivision (b) (2) is limited to those suits
in which a class action injunction or declaratory judgment is needed to
enjoin the party opposing the class from continuing activities which are
violative of the rights of the class as a whole. Thus, classes which may
have maintained an action under either of these first two subdivisions
have been described as being more cohesive than the amorphous class
3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
s C. Wucrr & A. MILER, 7A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1786 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Wucrr & MILLER]. One court has noted
that virtually every class action that meets the requirements of 23(b) (1) or 23(b)
(2) will also meet the less severe requirements of 23(b) (3). . . . The Advisory
Committee recognized that Rule 23(b) (3) is designed for situations where class
action treatment is not so clearly called for as in subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2)
of Rule 23.
Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
1975]
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that can maintain an action under Rule 23(b) (3).6 The courts have
generally recognized that the distinctive nature of the (b) (1) and (b)
(2) class must be contrasted with the broad scope of the Rule 23(b) (3)
class in which the only bond among the class members may be their
aspiration "to remedy a common legal grievance."7
B. Characteristics of (b) (2) Class Actions
Rule 23(b) (2) is applicable to those cases in which final declaratory
or injunctive relief with respect to the entire class is appropriate. A
class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b) (2) when the party
opposing the class has acted in such a way as to form a pattern of activity
toward the members of the class,8 or has established a regulatory scheme
which is common to all members of the class. 9 The activity need only
be "generally applicable" to the class as a whole.10
6 See Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice under Rule
23(c) (2), 10 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 571 (1969). See also Wucrr & MILLER, supra
note 5, § 1786. As one noted authority has stated:
[(b) (1) and (b) (2) classes] tend to be cohesive groups because the rule requires
that the members have similar interests in the subject matter of the litigation
or be seeking relief applicable to all of them (an injunction or declaratory judg-
ment). Thus, members of a Rule 23(b) (1) or a Rule 23(b) (2) class usually are
related in interest in the sense that they are seeking the same remedy or are
asserting the same claims or defenses.
Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 315 (1973).
Under 23(b) (3), all types of suits are permitted to qualify as class actions upon a
finding by the court that the issues which are common to the class predominate over
the issues which affect only individual members, and that the class action procedure is
superior to all other methods for adjudication of the controversy. Whether the use of
the class action in a particular case would be "superior" to other available means of
adjudication is apparently the determining factor considered by the courts. See, e.g.,
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Alpert v.
United States Indus., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
7 Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 218 (D. Md. 1971).
A suit challenging a pattern of activity where the party opposing the class acts in a
consistent manner toward the members of a class, can be brought as a class action
under subdivision (b) (2). In this type of suit, one who is affected by the pattern of
activity can seek a decision from the court that the challenged conduct violates the rights
of the affected class and a court order to prevent the opposing party from continuing
the activity. This is one type of suit for which Rule 23(b) (2) was intended. See
Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 187 (E.D. La. 1968) (where the court
maintained a (b) (2) class action against an employer to enjoin allegedly "established
discriminatory policy or policies" which if proven would have been in violation of equal
employment opportunities). See also Russo v. Kirby, 335 F. Supp. 122 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (enjoining administrators from continuing "practice" of denying food stamps to
employees on strike).
One who is affected by a regulatory scheme, which is common to all members of the
class, can initiate a suit challenging the continued use of that scheme under subdivision
(b) (2). See, e.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on
on other grounds, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) ((b) (2)
class action proper to challenge dress code regulations promulgated by a high school as
being violative of the Civil Rights Act); Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport,
312 F. Supp. 692, 694 n.2 (D.R.I. 1970) (challenge to regulation requiring two years of
residency for admission to federally financed public housing is properly maintained under
Rule 23(b) (2)).
10 The fact that not all members of the class are aggrieved or adversely affected by the
[Vol. 24:504
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Subdivision (b) (2) class actions have often been successfully imple-
mented in civil rights cases," including employment discrimination
suits.' 2  The class action under (b) (2) thus becomes a powerful vehicle
to counter the awesome power of the corporate employer.
There are two important differences, however, between subdivision
(b) (2) and subdivision (b) (3) class actions which must be perceived in
order to understand the distinct notice requirements of each. First,
there are provisions in Rule 23 which permit class members of a (b) (3)
class action to "opt out," or exclude themselves from the adjudication
upon notification to the court, and thus not be bound by any judgment
rendered in the class action, either for or against the class.13 There are
no "opt out" provisions available in (b) (2) class actions, and it has been
repeatedly held that (b) (2) class members have no such right to exclude
themselves from the class action.14 It is reasoned that because of the
opposing party's actions does not change the propriety of maintaining the class under
Rule 23(b) (2). Under the accepted interpretation as it is used in Rule 23(b) (2), the
term "generally applicable" does not require the party opposing the class to act directly
against each member of the class. "As long as his action would affect all persons
similarly situated, his acts apply generally to the whole class." Comment, Rule 23
Categories in Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 539, 542 (1969). This inter-
pretation is consistent with the intention of the drafters of the Rule, as evidenced by the
Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (b) (2) which states in part:
Action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of [subdivision (b)
(2)] even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or a few members
of the class, provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the
class.
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
As an example of this interpretation of "generally applicable," it has been held that a
number of persons who had been displaced by an urban renewal project could maintain
a subdivision (b) (2) class action to challenge alleged discrimination in their relocation,
even though a number of the members of the class were completely satisfied with their
new dwellings. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968). The court in Norwalk CORE stated that "[t]he fact that some members
of the class were personally satisfied with the defendant's relocation efforts is irrele-
vant." Id. at 937.
l The drafters of Rule 23 recognized that subdivision (b) (2) is well suited for use in civil
rights litigation. See Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
The Note also indicates that use of Rule 23(b) (2) class actions is not limited to civil
rights ,suits. Id.
'2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), modified,
495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
'3 The term "opt out" has been coined to describe the option which members of a subdivi-
sion (b) (3) class have to exclude themselves from the litigation. FED. R. Crv. P. 23
(c) (2) provides that
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the
court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date;
(B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do
not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may,
if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel. (Emphasis added.)
One of the main reasons of requiring notice to all members of a subdivision (b) (3)
class is to notify the class members of their opportunity to "opt out" of the class.
14 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Air Lines Inc., 490 F.2d
19751
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cohesive nature of the (b) (2) class action, absent class members cannot
be permitted to opt out of the class, for to do so would jeopardize the
effect of this type of class action. 15
The second difference between (b) (2) and (b) (3) actions is that
suits cannot be certified under the (b) (2) classification if "the appro-
priate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages." 16 This restriction on the (b) (2) action often limits its use to cases
which do not relate to any type of property interest of the absent class
members, 7 with the consequence that strict due process safeguards are
not required in all cases. The more rigid due process safeguards are al-
most always necessary in the (b) (3) type of class action since, there, the
adjudication of property interests of the absent class members is the norm.
636 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974); Beckerman v. Sands, 364 F. Supp.
1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
15 Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Air Lines Inc., 490 F.2d
636 (7th Cir. 1973).
16 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 102 (1966).
t7 There seems to be little doubt that monetary relief may be awarded in addition to an
injunctive decree in a (b) (2) class action under appropriate circumstances. Cf. King
v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Courts often award back
pay in employment discrimination cases maintained under subdivision (b) (2). See,
e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969); Rush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1974);
Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), modified,
495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Local 186 v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ind. 1969). As a result of the expressed
limitation in the Advisory Committee Notes, many courts have held that where it ap-
pears clear that a monetary award is a substantial and essential element of the plain-
tiff's claim, certification under 23(b) (2) would be considered inappropriate. Un-
fortunately, many courts have used a finding of predominant monetary awards to
deny class certification under (b) (2) without articulating any standards or tests with
respect to what constitutes predominant monetary damages. See Graybeal v. American
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 15 (D.D.C. 1973). No guidelines are suggested in the
Rule or Advisory Notes for determining whether monetary relief is the predominant
final remedy sought. Consequently many otherwise meritorious (b) (2) classes have been
dismissed on an unarticulated finding that money awards are predominant. Because
of the need to deal with the substantive issues and merits of many cases to determine if
there are rights which are being violated by activities which should be enjoined, class
actions should not be summarily dismissed on an unarticulated finding of predominant
money damages. Disputes in this area should be settled in favor of class certification,
with procedural safeguards applied to protect absent class members' interests if neces-
sary. As one noted commentator has stated:
Disputes over whether the action is primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief
rather than a monetary award neither promote the disposition of the case on the
merits nor represent a useful expenditure of energy. Therefore, they should be
avoided. If the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or
declaratory relief has been requested, the action usually should be allowed to
proceed under subdivision (b) (2). Those aspects of the case not falling within
Rule 23(b) (2) should be treated as incidental.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, at § 1775. Finally, these findings of predominant money
damages based on unarticulated standards are particularly unfortunate since a decision
denying class certification is reviewable only with respect to whether the trial court
abused its discretion in making the class determination. See, e.g., Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Manning v. International Union, 466
F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972); Kansas City v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 826 (1953).
[Vol. 24:504
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II. NoTicE Fo (b) (2) ACTIONS
The courts have recognized two concepts when considering whether
or not notice is required for class actions in general. The first is
whether the statutory provisions of Rule 23 require that pretrial notice
be given to absent class members in the particular situation. The second
is whether minimum due process requirements necessitate pretrial notice.
There are two subdivisions of Rule 23 which discuss notice to absent
members of class action suits: subdivisions (c) (2) and (d) (2). Subdivi-
sion (c) (2) has been labeled the "mandatory notice" provision since it
provides that the court shall direct the best notice practicable to all
members of the class if the action is maintained under Rule 23(b) (3).
Subdivision (d) (2) provides for discretionary notice which permits the
court to order notice when it is deemed necessary," but this subdivision
cannot be construed as requiring such notice.19 The (c) (2) mandatory
notice provision has recently been interpreted as requiring notice in all
class actions brought under Rule 23(b) (3),20 but its application is ex-
pressly limited to only subdivision (b) (3) class actions.21 Thus, when
determining if notice is required in a (b) (2) class action, the only rele-
vant consideration is whether due process requires that such notice be
given to all absent class members.
The right to notice under Rule 23 (b) (2) has not yet been considered
by the Supreme Court. The lower courts, however, have split on their
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2) provides:
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for
the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and pre-
sent claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; .. .
19 See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)
(no notice is specifically required under Rule 23(b) (2)); Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972); Miller, Problems of
Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313 (1973). See also Wmicrr & MILLER,
supra note 5, at § 1793.
20 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2). In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 n.14
(1974), the Court stated in part: "By its terms subdivision (c) (2) is inapplicable to class
actions for injunctive or declaratory relief maintained under subdivision (b) (2)."
Other courts have held that the mandatory notice provision is inapplicable to class
actions brought under subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2), Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp.
351 (D. Md.), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 904 (1972), and that the mandatory notice
provision is expressly limited to class actions brought under subdivision (b) (3). See,
e.g., Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar
Refining Corp. 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972), modified, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp.
619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972). See also CCH MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LmCATION, § 1.45 (3d ed. 1973).
1975]
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resolution of the issue - a result primarily ascribable to differing interpre-
tations of the Supreme Court's statements in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.2 2  Some jurisdictions have ruled that due process re-
quires notice in all class actions.2 3  In contrast, a greater number of
jurisdictions have reached the conclusion that "the essential requisite of
due process as to absent members of class [actions] is not notice, but the
adequacy of representation of their interests by [the] named parties."2 4
One of the first courts to comment on the due process notice require-
ments under the amended Rule 23 was the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in its 1968 decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,25 now referred
to as Eisen 11.26
22 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
2' The following jurisdictions have held that due process requires notice in all class ac-
tions:
2d Cir. - Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (alternatively
known as Eisen II). For a complete case history of all the Eisen decisions see
note 26, infra.
La. - Clark v. American Marine Corp., 297 F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (E.D. La. 1969).
But see Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La.1970).
N.Y. - United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311, 316 (W.D.N.Y.
1971); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem.,
404 U.S. 1055 (1972); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Fowles v. American Export Lines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1293,
1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Va. - Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122, 124 (W.D. Va. 1970).
24 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds. 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds,.441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1063 (1972). The following jurisdictions have followed the Northern Natural Gas
position and have held that due process does not require notice in all class actions:
1st Cir. - Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1st Cir. 1972);
3d Cir. - Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1974);
5th Cir. - Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969);
10th Cir. - In re Four Seas6ns- Smtoirities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th
Cir. 1974);
Conn. - Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 722 (D. Conn. 1973);
Wilczynski v. Harder, 323 F. Supp. 509, 512 n.3 (D. Conn. 1971);
D.C. - Woodward v. Rodgers, 344 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.D.C. 1972);
Fla. - Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163, 166 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Mungin v.
Florida East Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 732 (M.D. Fla. 1970);
Ga. - Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139, 141 (S.D. Ga.
1972), modified, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
Kan. - Citizens Environmental Council v. Volpe, 364 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D. Kan.
1973); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan.
1968), af 'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
La. - Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 301 (E.D. La. 1970);
Md. - Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1192
(D. Md. 1973); Vaughns v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County, 355 F.
Supp. 1034, 1035 (D. Md. 1972); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 361
(D. Md. 1972), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
N.Y. - Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Pa. - Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972);
R.I. - Giguere v. Affleck, 370 F. Supp. 154, 159 (D. R.I. 1974); Berman v. Nar-
ragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 338 (D. R.I. 1969).
25 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
26 During its eight years of litigation to date, the Eisen case has produced eight reported
[Vol. 24:504
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A. The Minority Rule - Due Process Requires
Notice in all Class Actions
In 1966, Morton Eisen initiated a class action on behalf of himself
and all other odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange charging
brokerage firms and defendant stock exchange with violations of the anti-
trust and securities laws . 2  As the defendants recognized the tactical
advantage of having a large class, estimates of the size of the class grew
to over six million class members for which the defendant was able to
supply names and addresses of over two million. 2 The district court
initially dismissed the class action feature of the Eisen case partly as a
result of the trial judge's belief that a class that large suggests "almost
insuperable difficulties in fair and proper management of this suit as a
class action."29 During the appeal of this dismissal, plaintiff apparently
became aware of the fact that even if the court of appeals reversed,
plaintiff might be foreclosed from proceeding with his suit as a class ac-
tion because of an inability to pay for notice if the action was classified
under Rule 23(b) (3) which arguably would have required expensive no-
tice to all of the millions of absent class members. Therefore, plaintiff
argued to the court of appeals that the action could be maintained as a
(b) (1) or (b) (2) class action and that if so maintained individual notice
was thus not required.
opinions covering approximately 105 pages of various West's reporters. To facilitate
discussion of the decisions, commentators have labeled the Circuit Court and Supreme
Court opinions as Eisen I, Eisen II, etc. The following chart should aid in the under-










Citation Synopsis of Holding
41 F.R.D. 147 Class action aspect of Eisen case summarily
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). dismissed.
370 F.2d 119 Held that the denial of class action was final
(2d Cir. 1966). appealable order even though individual ac-
tion was not dismissed, thus endorsing the
"death knell" theory.
391 F.2d 555 Reversed dismissal of the class action aspect
(2d Cir. 1968). holding in essence that district court could not
dismiss merely because the class is large;
remanded but retained jurisdiction.
50 F.R.D. 471 On remand, trial court held that additional
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). hearings would be required to build record.
52 F.R.D. 253 Held class action could be maintained; indi-
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). vidual notice not necessary.
54 F.R.D. 565 Mini-hearings on merits.
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
479 F.2d 1005 Reversed the granting of class action certifi-
(2d Cir. 1973). cation; held individual notice required for
(b) (3) class action.
417 U.S. 156 Held inter alia that notice is required for (b)
(1974). (3) class actions.
2' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
28 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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In Eisen i1,30 the court of appeals expressed its disagreement with
both contentions offered by the plaintiff. The circuit court held, first,
that the Eisen class could not be categorized under either Rule 23(b) (1)
or (b) (2);31 instead, subdivision (b) (3) was the only type of class action
applicable in the plaintiffs situation. Second, the court in dicta observed
that due process required notice in all representative actions and that
"23 (c) (2) merely requires a particularized form of notice in 23 (b) (3)
actions. ' 3 2 To support this view the circuit court simply cited Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.33 and a section of the Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes,34 neither of which fully deals with the issue. The section
of the Advisory Committee's Notes cited refers to "mandatory notice
pursuant to subdivision (c) (2)" which is not applicable to class actions
brought under subdivisions (b) (1) or (b) (2). 35 Thus, it does not support
the proposition for which it was cited.
The holding of the Eisen H court was also much too broad to be
based solely upon the holding of Mullane and, in fact, the author submits
that Mullane does not support the Second Circuit's position. In Mullane
the Court addressed the constitutional sufficiency of publication notice to
known beneficiaries of a common trust fund during a judicial settle-
ment. Mullane did not deal with a suit even vaguely comparable to a
subdivision (b) (2) class action. The judicial action in Mullane was not
for injunctive or declaratory relief, but rather was an action predomi-
nently for the division of money in the fund - a division of the property
of the absent parties. All of the absentee beneficiaries in Mullane had
a known property interest in the trust fund, a property interest of which
they could not be deprived without due process of law. Moreover, Mul-
lane was not a class action in which one party litigated the controversy as
a representative of a class. The individual notice which the Supreme
Court ultimately ordered in Mullane was not typical of class action notice
from the class representative to the absent class members, but was notice
30 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
31 Id. The court reasoned that the Eisen suit could not be classified as a (b) (1) action
because there was no chance of inconsistent adjudications since no individuals could
afford the expense of lengthy antitrust litigation on their own to create varying and
inconsistent standards for the defendant. The court also found that the primary claim
was for damages and thus subdivision (b) (2) was not applicable.
32 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391 F.2d 555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968).
33 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
34 The court in Eisen II cited "Advisory Committee's Note at 107." Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391 F.2d 555, 565 (2d Cir. 1968). This citation refers to the
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966). (For the Eisen II
court's own explanation of this citation see 391 F.2d at 560). The page and section
cited by the court in Eisen I1, at 106, provides:
Indeed, under subdivision (c) (2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely
discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b) (3) class action an oppor-
tunity to secure exclusion from the class. This mandatory notice pursuant to
subdivision (c) (2), together with any discretionary notice which the court may
find it advisable to give under subdivision (d) (2), is designed to fulfill require-
ments of due process to which the class action procedure is of course subject.
35 See discussion accompanying notes 18-21, supra.
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from the party opposing the class to the absent class members informing
the class members of the action which was being taken against them.
The Second Circuit, unfortunately, failed to make these distinctions.
Aside from the factual differences between Mullane and Eisen II,
the rule of Mullane is not so clear as to justify a mere cite to the case
as authority for the proposition that notice is required in all class ac-
tions. Indeed, in Dolgow v. Anderson,3 6 Judge Weinstein, writing for a
New York District Court at the same time the Eisen II opinion was be-
ing written, examined and analyzed Mullane quite differently in arriving
at the conclusion that "[t]he Supreme Court has indicated that adequacy
of representation, not form of notice, is the crucial consideration.
37
In an extensive analysis of the due process notice requirements, including
cites to numerous authorities in addition to Mullane, Judge Weinstein
interpreted the holding of Mullane as denoting that notice is not to be re-
quired in all representative actions. According to Judge Weinstein, the
Supreme Court indicated "that a pragmatic, case-by-case approach to this
issue is warranted," 38 with due process requiring " 'notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,' taking into ac-
count its 'practicalities and peculiarities.' "39 Given this analysis, the
Second Circuit's interpretation of Mullane, if not inaccurate, is at least
an overbroad use of authority.
Nonetheless, the courts within the Second Circuit have routinely
cited this dicta in Eisen II for the proposition that notice is required in all
class actions, without supplying any additional analysis or rationale.40
One court, for example, found it sufficient to state that "notification of
all members of the class is required as a matter of due process" and to cite
Eisen II as authority.4 As a result of this misapplication of Eisen II, the
rule that due process requires notice in all representative actions is now
recognized as the controlling view in the courts of the Second Circuit.42
B. The Majority Rule - Adequate Representation
The courts are divided on the issue of notice with the Eisen II rule con-
trolling in only a minority of jurisdictions. 43 Interestingly, the split in
authority arose subsequent to the Second Circuit's decision. In Northern
36 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y.1968).
37 Id. at 500.
38 Id.
39 Id.
4o See, e.g., Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Zachary v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
41 Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1055
(1972).
42 See Lynch v. Sperry Rand Corp., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court stated
that
(a]s for the question of notice: in this Circuit notice is required in all class
actions as a matter of due process, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (11), 391 F.2d
555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968) ....
43 Compare cases cited note 24, with cases cited note 23, supra.
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Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds," Judge Brown carefully analyzed the Eisen
II position, repudiated the Second Circuit's holding, and stated that "the
essential requisite of due process . . . is not notice, but the adequacy of
representation. '"4 5  Judge Brown cited Dolgow v. Anderson48 and en-
dorsed Judge Weinstein's interpretation of Mullane rather than the Sec-
ond Circuit's treatment in Eisen II.
Judge Brown rejected the contention that due process required notice
to be given in all (b) (2) class actions and found that the Supreme Court's
statements on minimum due process standards did not dictate the neces-
sity for such a rule. He adopted instead a flexible rule permitting the
trial court in a (b) (2) action to determine on a case-by-case method
whether notice need be given, and if so, the nature of such notice. Ac-
cordingly, in Northern Natural Gas, Judge Brown determined, that pro-
viding notice did not impose an extraordinary burden upon the plaintiff
and thus ordered that notice be given.
The Northern Natural Gas position has not only found more accep-
tance in the courts outside of the Second Circuit than has the restrictive
Eisen II position,47 but has also merited the approval of the commenta-
tors.48 Moore's Federal Practice, for example, states:
We believe [Judge Brown] is right and, with deference, the
Eisen [II] position is not sound. The Rule [23] does not de-
mand notice in the (b) (1) and (b) (2) actions; and, although
the operation of the Rule in a particular case might violate due
process, there is a strong presumption that the Rule qua rule is
valid. And practicalities support the same conclusion. The
Eisen [II] approach is too inflexible. Some (b) (1) and (b) (2)
actions will have gained wide notoriety. Notice would add little
or nothing. There will be situations where the class is cohesive,
or where the legal relationship of the members enable one or
more to stand in judgment for all, and where the representatives
are truly representative and faithful - a most important fac-
tor.
4 9
The case-by-case approach to (b) (2) notice, as adopted by the major-
ity, provides the flexibility needed to cope with diverse situations.
44 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 441 F.2d
704 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
45 292 F. Supp. at 636.
46 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
4" Compare the cases which support the Northern Natural Gas position, note 24, with the
cases which support the Eisen II position, note 23 supra.
4s Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 314 (1973); WmcHT
& MILLER, supra note 5, at § 1786; 313 J. MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, 23.55 (1974).
49 3B J. MooRE's FEDERAL PRAncrEc, 23.55 (1974).
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C. A Third View - Absolute Failure to Give Notice
Violates Due Process
The split in authority on the issue of whether due process requires
that notice be given to absent class members under Rule 23(b) (2) has
been further confused by a line of cases in which the defendants have
challenged unnotified plaintiff class members' use of the res judicata ef-
fect of previous (b) (2) class action decisions. Commencing with Greg-
ory v. Hershey,50 these cases have held that the absolute failure of the
class representative to give notice to absent class members in the original
class action rendered the purported class action invalid thus forming a
basis for collateral attack on the decision. In Gregory, the plaintiff had
obtained a declaratory judgment, purportedly on behalf of all selective
service registrants, that invalidated the selective service regulation which
precluded those who had received student deferments from later becom-
ing eligible for fatherhood deferments. After certification as a subdivi-
sion (b) (2) class action on behalf of Gregory and all other similarly
situated draft inductees, the district court found the regulation unconsti-
tutional and enjoined its enforcement. No notice was ordered or given
to the absent members of the class.
Several suits followed in which individuals alleged they were members
of the Gregory class and sought to enforce the Gregory decision. In
their attempts to get fatherhood deferments they asserted the Gregory
decision as res judicata. Two district courts ruled that since plaintiffs in
these subsequent suits were described as members of the Gregory class,
the original decision in that case was binding on them.5' Thus, they
enjoined the draft boards from enforcing the regulation against the unin-
formed class members.
Several other district courts, however, refused to be bound by the
Gregory decision and allowed the government to relitigate the issue of
the constitutionality of the selective service regulation.5 2 Since there had
been absolutely no notice given to the absent class members in the orig-
inal class action, the court reasoned, those absent members were not mem-
bers of the original plaintiff class. By this means these courts held that
the Gregory decision was not binding upon them.
50 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd on the merits sub nor., Gregory v. Tarr, 436
F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 990 (1971).
51 Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb. 1970), vacated, 443 F.2d 1370 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); Germonprez v. Director of Selective Service,
318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970). See also Judge Eschbach's well articulated dissent in
Schrader v. Selective Service System, 470 F.2d 73, 77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1085 (1972).
52 Schrader v. Selective Service System, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1972); Pasquier v. Tarr,
318 F. Supp.. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971); McCarthy v.
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The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed Gregory on the merits-
but it did not decide the issue of notice until the case of Zeilstra v. Tarr.
54
In that case the Sixth Circuit held that the failure to give notice rendered
the class action futile.55  Zeilstra relied on Eisen 115 for the proposi-
tion that due process required notice in all class actions and since no
notice was given in Gregory there was never a valid class.
5 7
The decisions that invalidated the Gregory class action because of a
lack of notice tended to rely on the dying "doctrine of mutuality"58 in
that if the individual plaintiff in the original Gregory class action had been
unsuccessful in his attempt to invalidate the selective service regulation,
the absent members of Gregory's purported class would be able to enter
other courts and relitigate the validity of the regulation. These courts'
rationale was based on the premise that the unnotified absent class mem-
bers would not be bound by the res judicata effect of the original class
action and could collaterally attack that judgment due to the lack of noti-
fication. 59 Thus, the argument continues, to rule that the defendant-
government was bound by the decision of the original class action would
give "absent members of the class two bites at the apple at the expense
of the defendant."60
I Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971).
54 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
55 Id.
36 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II), 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
57 466 F.2d at 113.
Even assuming arguendo the validity of the minority position that absence of notice is
per se violative of due process in all representative suits, the holdings in the Gregory
line of cases seem to be totally inconsistent with modern res judicata notions. See
Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301
(1961); Polasky, Collateral Estoppel - Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217
(1954); Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CO"NEU. L.Q. 724
(1967). Under the doctrine of mutuality, in order to take advantage of a judgment one
must have been so related to the case that he would have been bound by it if the judgment
had gone the other way. The government in these cases argued that unnotified class
members were not related closely enough to the original case to be bound. Thus, the
government contended that if the unnotified class members were not bound, then
under the doctrine of mutuality, the government in subsequent actions would also not
be bound.
Many recent cases have discussed the question if and under what conditions the rule
of mutuality should be abandoned. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Nickerson v. Pep Boys - Manny, Moe &
Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965). See also Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). Some
courts have abandoned or made exceptions to the mutuality rule. Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Elder v. New York
& Pa. Motor Express, 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940); Good Health Dairy Prods.
Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758 (1937). The reasoning is that a strict applica-
tion of the mutuality rule would result in expensive and time consuming litigation of an
issue which had been thoroughly tried in a previous case. Furthermore, it did not seem
unfair to hold the first judgment conclusive, since the party adverse to the judgment
already had his day in court. See generally Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Sav. Ass'n, supra.
51 This hypothesis relies on the unrealistic assumption that in a subsequent action by an
unnotified class member a court would completely ignore the persuasive authority and
stare decisis effect of a previous decision adverse to the class of draft inductees.
60 Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (E.D. La. 1970).
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The courts' fear of giving the plaintiff "two bites at the apple" resulted
in giving the defendant-government at least two bites. In the original
Gregory action the court implicitly found that the plaintiff adequately
represented the class as a whole.6 ' The government at the time had a
full opportunity to litigate the issues of the plaintiff's ability to represent
the class and the lack of notification to absent class members. The gov-
ernment declined the challenge in Gregory but was allowed to pursue the
same issues in subsequent cases.
The gross error which these courts made in interpreting the nature of
Rule 23(b) (2) class actions was in part due to a belief that the district
court in the original Gregory action erred in its disposition of the merits
of the case.62 In their attempts to reach the correct decision, these courts
created a regrettable precedent in the area of class actions. The courts in
these cases used the minority view that notice is required in subdivision
(b) (2) actions to satisfy due process, without even recognizing the con-
flicting majority position. Thus the defendant-government was given a
second chance to argue the validity of its draft regulation. If any feature
in this line of cases is violative of due process, it is the "second chance
doctrine" for which the government argued and the courts adopted -
not the lack of notice to the absent class members.
III. EFFECT OF EISEN IV ON THE MAJORITY RULE
Although there is some indication that the minority rule on (b) (2)
notice needs reconsideration in light of the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Eisen IV,63 the majority position that due process requires ade-
quate representation of the absent members of a (b) (2) class, rather
than notice, remains unaffected. The Court in Eisen IV dealt only with
the interpretation of the notice requirements of subdivision (c) (2) of
Rule 23 and its application to class actions brought under 23(b) (3).
The Supreme Court in Eisen IV did not deal with the consitutional re-
quirements of due process with respect to all types of class actions.
At first glance, however, one small passage in Justice Powell's opin-
ion seems to be contrary to the view held in the majority of jurisdictions.
After explaining the Rule 23(c) (2) mandatory notice provision and its
non-discretionary application to the Eisen (b) (3) class, Justice Powell
stated:
61 As a prerequisite to certifying a suit as a class action, Rule 23(a) (4) requires a
finding that the class representative is adequately representing the class. The district
court's certification of the original Gregory suit as a class action evidences that this
finding was made. Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
12 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974) recently refused
to follow the rationale of the Gregory-Zielstra line of cases even though they were
supposedly the controlling law of its jurisdiction. The court noted that these cases were
tainted with "implications for national security which may have influenced the [Sixth
Circuit] Court to take such a broad position" and that the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Eisen IV "seems to require that the matter be re-examined." Id. at 960 n.ll.
'3 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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Petitioner further contends that adequate representation,
rather than notice, is the touchstone of due process in a class
action and therefore satisfies Rule 23. We think this view has
little to commend it. To begin with, Rule 23 speaks to notice
as well as to adequacy of representation and requires that both
be provided. Moreover, petitioner's argument proves too much,
for it quickly leads to the conclusion that no notice at all, pub-
lished or otherwise, would be required in the present case. This
cannot be so, for quite apart from what due process may require,
the command of Rule 23 is clearly to the contrary. We there-
fore conclude that Rule 23(c) (2) requires that individual notice
be sent to all class members who can be identified with reason-
able effort.1
4
Powell's opinion could mislead one into believing that due process re-
quired something more than adequate representation in all class actions.
Perhaps fearful of an erroneous conclusion, the Court pointed out in a
footnote to the passage that their concern was only with the notice re-
quirements of class actions brought under subdivision (b) (3).65 Thus,
the Supreme Court's holding in Eisen IV is not inconsistent with the view
held by the majority of courts on the issue of minimum due process re-
quirements for class actions.
A. Four Reasons Why Notice is Not Required in (b) (2) Actions
One or more of four reasons are usually given by the courts following
the majority view in order to justify their decision that due process does
not require notice in all (b) (2) class actions. Chief Judge Fox of the
Western District of Michigan recently presented an excellent discussion
of the four reasons in Watson v. Branch County Bank.6 An examination
of these four reasons illustrates why the restrictive mandatory notice rule
is not required in all (b) (2) class actions.
1. The Drafting of Rule 23
In 1966 when Rule 23 was adopted, many basic constitutional prin-
ciples concerning the due process requirements of notice had already been
developed. The drafters of the Rule were aware of these due process
principles, and carefully considered their requirements when drafting
Rule 23. Nothing in the Rule requires that notice be given in all (b) (2)
class actions even though such a requirement is imposed on (b) (3) class
actions. "Although it is axiomatic that a rule of civil procedure cannot
take precedence over the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Supreme Court's approach in Eisen indicates that Rule 23 is presump-
64 Id. at 176-77.
65 Id. at 177 n. 14.
18 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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tively valid as comprehending adequate due process protections. '"6 7
Thus, there is a strong presumption that if the Rule does not require notice
in all (b) (2) class actions, then such notice is not required by due process.
It is further reasoned that the drafters anticipated that those (b) (2) ac-
tions which do require notice to satisfy due process would be the excep-
tions and could be handled on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the dis-
cretionary notice provision.
2. The Absence of Property Rights
The fifth amendment provides that no person shall be "deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."68 Actions under
23(b) (2) generally do not involve property rights but "involve broad
questions of constitutional or statutory law and public policy."69  In
contrast, actions brought under 23(b) (3) nearly always deal with absent
class members' substantive property interests or legal claims against the
party opposing the class. Due process prohibits in these cases the ad-
judication of an individual's right to property or claim for damages in his
absence when he has not been notified of the action.70  Since adjudi-
cation of property interests are unusual in (b) (2) actions, and since
claims predominantly for monetary damages are not permitted in this type
of action,7 ' absent class members in a (b) (2) action often have no legal
interest to which due process will attach. Again it is reasoned that dis-
cretionary notice can be ordered in the unusual (b) (2) action where legal-
ly protectable interests are being adjudicated.
3. The Right to "Opt Out"
Subdivision (b) (2) class members are not permitted to "opt out" of
a class action 2 and thus they must remain a part of the class whether
they are notified of the action or not. In contrast, every member of a
(b) (3) class action has an absolute right to be excluded from the adjudi-
cation. 3 To make this right to opt out effective, members of the (b) (3)
class must be notified of the pendency of the action and of their right to
exclude themselves. Therefore, as a practical matter, notice must be
provided in all (b) (3) class actions. Since this pragmatic justification for
ordering notice to all class members is not applicable to (b) (2) class ac-
tions, the only practical reason remaining to require notice in (b) (2) ac-
tions is to inform absent class members of their right to intervene and
17 Id. at 956.
'S U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 958 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
71 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
r See notes 16-17, supra, and accompanying text.
72 See notes 13-15, supra, and accompanying text.
73 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
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participate personally in the litigation. It has been held, however, that
there is no absolute right to intervene in a (b) (2) class action.14  More-
over, it can be assumed that fewer absent class members will be interested
enough in the litigation to intervene, as compared with the number of ab-
sent class members who might exercise the minimal effort required to
opt out of a (b) (3) class action. In those actions where absent class mem-
bers are more likely to intervene in the action, the courts may order dis-
cretionary notice.75
4. The Objective of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure declares that the basic
objective of the Rules is "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."7 6 One court has observed that:
Class actions are a relatively inexpensive, expeditious, and so-
cially desirable way for a few named plaintiffs, usually repre-
sented by highly professional public interest attQrneys, to raise
substantial questions concerning the constitutional or statutory
rights of a large number of people and to secure comprehen-
sive and just remedies where rights are shown to be violated.7 7
Thus, given the purpose of the class action there are many (b) (2) ac-
tions which may be adjudicated without prejudicing the rights of absent
class members notwithstanding the fact that they were not notified of the
pendency of the action.78  A rule requiring notice in all (b) (2) class ac-
tions requires excessive and unnecessary notice which imposes sub-
stantial burdens on the parties and necessarily involves procedural com-
plications in contravention of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules. Furthermore,
requiring notice may place a substantial burden on the courts in that ab-
sent class member are often required to communicate directly with the
court.7 9  Much court time would necessarily be required to respond to
these inquiries.
Consideration of these four factors is the reason why the courts in the
majority of jurisdictions have rejected a restrictive rule requiring notice
74 See Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974). In Watson,
Judge Fox reasoned that:
There is no compelling reason why the court ought to invite absent class mem-
bers to intervene. Certainly individual class members have no absolute right to
intervene in a class action. The very existence of Rule 23 negatives the idea
that absent members of a 23(b) (2) class are indispensible under Rule 19(b).
In the circumstances of this case and probably most or all other 23(b) (2) actions,
no absent class member is even "necessary" under Rule 19(a). Individual class
members are thus merely "permissive" parties, and the court may in its discre-
tion refuse to allow them to intervene personally. Id. at 960.
7 See discussion accompanying note 85 infra, for additional explanation of notice for the
purpose of facilitating intervention.
7 FEn. R. Civ. P. 1.
77 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 957 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
's See notes 67-71, supra, and accompanying text.
'9 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 959 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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in all (b) (2) actions. Yet these courts recognize and retain their right
to order discretionary notice in those exceptional (b) (2) cases where
notice may be warranted to insure the fair conduct of the action.
Notice presents no problem when the class is small and the cost of
giving individually mailed notice is very slight. In this situation the court
should allow notice to be given unless there are unusual circumstances
militating against such notice. 0 The difficulty arises when the class is so
large that the cost of individual notice would be prohibitive or when the
class and its representatives are indigent and cannot afford even the
slightest cost of giving notice.81  In such situations the court is faced
with a number of questions. When should discretionary notice be or-
dered? What type of notice should be given? Must the cost of notice
be the burden of the class representative in all cases? Some of these
questions have not as yet been answered - or at least their status after
the Eisen IV has not yet been determined. The following discussion how-
ever may provide some insight into how these questions may be answered
in the future.
IV. DISCIETIONARY NOTICE: WHEN AND How
A. When is Discretionary Notice Warranted?
Judge Fox has concluded that given "the high cost to the parties and
the court" notice only need be given in "special circumstances, "82
though the courts have not as yet compiled a list of those situations
in which notice ought to be given. Indeed, Judge Fox indicated that it is
probably impossible to draw an exhaustive list to cover all recognizable
circumstances and thus, he offered only a few examples.83  In this
setting, an analysis of the functions of (b) (2) notice is the only appro-
priate means of determining whether discretionary notice is warranted.
Generally there are four functions which can be served by the issu-
ance of notice in the (b) (2) class action. These include:
First, informing absent class members of an adjudication which might
result in the deprivation of their "property" rights, in the unusual
(b) (2) action when property rights are being adjudicated;
80 There may be instances where countervailing considerations such as protecting public
interest may militate against giving any type of notice at all. One court refused to
allow even notice by publication in a civil rights case against allegedly discriminatory
police practices taking place in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in the late 1960's. Johnson v.
City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295, 302 (E.D. La. 1970). See also Hooks v.
Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 163, 166 (M.D. Fla. 1972), where the court declined to order
notice, concluding that notice "would serve no useful purpose." Id. at 166.
s1 See, e.g., Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S.
1055 (1972).
s2 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 959 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
s3 Id. Judge Fox suggested two examples of special circumstances where notice ought
to be given.
One such circumstance might be the presence of a damage claim in connection
with a suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Another might be the presence of a
defendant class. Id. at 959.
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Second, informing absent class members of their opportunity to inter-
vene in appropriate cases;
Third, testing the adequacy of named parties' representation of the ab-
sent class members' interests, and;
Fourth, providing information concerning the litigation to absent class
members as well as the general public, consistent with the concept
that the members of a free society have a "right to know."
Within this framework, if the particular (b) (2) action is, for example,
of the unusual type which adjudicates property rights, then notice must
certainly be provided prior to any judicial action which could deprive ab-
sent members of property without due process of law. 4
If, however, the function of the notice is only to inform absent mem-
bers that they may intervene, then notice is not as necessary since there
is no absolute right to intervene.85  The factor determining whether
notice should be ordered rests on the consideration of the likelihood that
absent class members would seek to intervene. Bearing upon this deci-
sion is whether the issue being litigated will have significant effect on the
individual class member, with special consideration given if the disposi-
tion of the suit would involve any possibility of monetary awards; whether
the members of the class lack the financial resources to intervene, and;
whether the class representative has the ability and is adequately repre-
senting the interests of the class without the help of intervenors.
In some cases, the function of notice may additionally aid in the de-
termination of whether named parties adequately represent the views of
the class. Notice could be ordered to serve this function in the appro-
priate case where adequacy of representation is seriously brought into
issue.
Finally, the "right to know" function may warrant some type of notice
in cases where ordering such notice would not impose an excessive bur-
den on the party supplying the notice. Notice to achieve this function isdesirmhle to maintain the integrity of the class action device. For exam-
ple, notice helps to militate against allegations of corruption of the class
action process by illuminating situations where collusive settlements, fav-
orable to named parties but detrimental to the class, can arise. Yet the
mere fulfillment of this "right to know" function, however desirable,
should not be used as grounds to order notice which would bring an end
to the action without reaching the merits of the case. In fact, of the
four functions of (b) (2) notice only the first function, when property
14 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
85 Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 960 (W.D. Mich. 1974). In this case
the court stated with respect to the intervention function that
[n]otice might invite members of the class to intervene to present claims or
defenses, or otherwise come into the action to provide, for example, a broader
representation of named plaintiffs, or to submit views as amici curiae. Id. at
959.
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rights are involved, requires that notice be given without regard to the
oppressiveness of the notice burden.
B. What Type of Notice Should be Ordered?
Prior to Eisen IV, discretionary notice pursuant to subdivision (d) (2)
was routinely held not to require individual mailed notice in all situa-
tions. For example, in Lopez v. Wyman,8 6 a decision from the Second
Circuit which held that notice is required in all class actions, the district
court directed notice of an action challenging the residency requirement
of a welfare statute to be given to "local departments of social services
throughout the state . . . , and see to it that appropriate notice is posted
in these offices."' 7  Even the Gregory's line of cases did not state that the
notice had to be individually mailed. Those cases merely held that "ab-
solute failure" to find in the trial court's record that absent members
had been notified invalidated the class. Presumably posting notices in
local selective service offices or on the campuses where men would have
obtained student deferments would have satisfied the notice require-
ments in those cases. Other courts and authorities have advocated al-
ternative methods of notification designed to satisfy the (d) (2) discre-
tionary notice requirements.8 9
The Eisen IV decision did not disturb the general rule that (d) (2) dis-
cretionary notice need not be individually mailed notice. The terms of
subdivision (d) (2) support this position stating that "notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members.
.. .-90 Individual notice has proven to be wasteful, expensive, and un-
duly burdensome in large classes, and often less effective than other meth-
ods of giving notice.9'
86 329 F. Supp. 483 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1055 (1972).
17 Id. at 486.
88 Gregory v. Hershey, 311 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969). See discussion accompanying
notes 50-62 supra. The court in Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (E.D. La.
1970), suggested that notice by publication in a prominent newspaper would have
satisfied the notice requirements in the original Gregory action.
85 The following cases illustrate imaginative notification, including use of publication
notice, notice in the form of commercials via television or radio, and the posting of
notice in areas frequented by purported class members. Fujishima v. Board of Educ.,
460 F.2d 1355, 1360 (7th Cir. 1972); Rota v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks,
64 F.R.D. 699, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 263 (D.
Md. 1972); Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971); Berman v.
Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969). See also examples listed in
Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313 (1973).
90 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2).
9' Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 321-22 (1973).
Professor Miller has come to the conclusion that the "sad truth is that notices issued by
courts or attorneys typically are much too larded with legal jargon to be understood by
the average citizen." Id. at 321. To illustrate this conclusion, he reproduced several
responses from North Carolina citizens who had received such notices from their state
Attorney General in connection with the "tetracycline cases." Professor Miller stated
that
[s]ome of the responses are worth reading because they are symptomatic of the
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One exception to the general rule is made when property interests are
involved. In such cases the form of notice would necessarily have to be
individually mailed notice.92 If the function of notice is merely to in-
form class members of the existence of the class action suit, or to enable
them to intervene in the suit, or to test the adequacy of representation,
then there is no need to provide individual notice. Alternative methods
should suffice.
Finally, an improved method of testing the adequacy of representa-
tion, may take the form of a questionnaire or a survey poll whereby the
court, or one of the parties, may question the class or a representative
cross-section of the class to determine whether the named representative
party represents an interest which is not inconsistent with the interests of
the class.9 3
C. Who Should Bear the Cost?
Prior to Eisen IV, there was authority to support the view that the class
representative in a (b) (2) action need not always be burdened with the
responsibility of providing and paying for notice. In one case, the de-
fendant correctional authorities were ordered, at their own expense, to
give notice to the plaintiff inmate class.94 In another case, the party
opposing the class was ordered to give notice of a challenge to a wel-
fare statute. 95 Upon considering the plaintiff's indigency and the media
coverage given the case, the court ordered the defendant to give notice
through the local departments of social service.96
The validity of these decisions is questionable, however, in light of
the Court's broad statement in Eisen IV, that
difficulty with the wording of most notices and reflect the problem of communi-
cating to lay people about legal matters. Id.
Some of the responses from the class members were as follows:
Dear Mr. Clerk: I have your notice that I owe you $300 for selling drugs. I
have never sold any drugs, especially those you have listed; but I have sold a
little whiskey once in a while.
Dear Sir: I received this paper from you. I guess I really don't understand
it, but if I have been given one of those drugs, nobody told me why. If it
means what I think it does, I have not been with a man in nine years.
Dear Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great
value to me in the future. I am unable to attend your class, however.
Dear Mr. Attorney General: I am sorry to say this, but you have the wrong
John Doe, because in 1954, I wasn't but three years old and didn't even have a
name. Mother named me when I got my driver's license. Up to then, they just
called me Baby Doe. Id. at 322.
52 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
13 See discussion accompanying note 99 infra for a more detailed explanation of this
proposal.
94 United States, ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311, 316 n.4, 319 n.2
(W.D.N.Y. 1971).
95 Lopez v. Wyman, 329 F. Supp. 483, 486 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S.
1055 (1972).
11 Id. at 486.
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It]he usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of
notice to the class . . . . Where, as here, the relationship be-
tween the parties is truly adversary, the plaintiff must pay for
the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financ-
ing his own suit.9 7
The only exception to this rule which the Court did not rule out was a
preexistent fiduciary duty between the plaintiff and the defendant.98
Regrettably, even though the Eisen case was maintained as a (b) (3) ac-
tion, it appears that the Court's statement with no qualifying notation
limiting its scope, may be construed to require plaintiffs in all types of
class actions to always pay for notice.
This rule, if it is held to be so, is unfortunate, as there is at least one
situation where plaintiff should not be required to pay for notice in a (b)
(2) action. This situation involves notice ordered by the court for the pur-
pose of testing the adequacy of representation, as a result of defendants'
allegation that the named plaintiff is inadequate as the class represen-
tative. In these circumstances, if the plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing that he is an adequate representative, the defendant should be
required to pay for notice to support his allegation of inadequate repre-
sentation.99 Conversely, if the court should initially rule that the named
plaintiff is not an adequate representative of the class, then he should be
permitted to demonstrate to the court his adequacy by providing for verifi-
cation notice. This latter proposal of conditioning a named plaintiff's
class certification on a verification of adequacy of representation has
already been utilized by several courts.100
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen IV), 417 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1974).
91 Id. at 178. The Court gave an example of a shareholder derivative action though they
specifically expressed no opinion on the proper allocation of the cost of notice in such
cases. Thus, the Court expressly avoided ruling on the validity of Judge Weinstein's
formulation for cost of notice allocation used in Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
498-500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
9' A prima facie showing of adequate representation is already required before class
certification as part of the 23(a) prerequisites. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). In the
proposed procedure, the party adverse to the adequacy of representation determination
would be permitted to challenge its soundness by means of a survey. This challenge
could be in the form of a court supervised questionnaire-notice to the class members or
a cross-section of the members of the class. The purpose of the questionnaire-notice
would be either to verify the adequacy of the representatives' position or to illustrate that
the class representative is not adequately representing the views and interests of the
class. Under this proposed plan the party challenging, or conversely verifying, the
adequacy of representation would bear the burden of the cost of the questionnaire-
notice. For example, if the court should decide that the class representative adequately
represents the interests of the class, then it would be up to the party opposing the class
to show by means of the survey that the class representative is not representing the
interests of the class. Conversely, if the court should find after the preliminary
examination that the class representative was not an adequate representative of the
class, then it would be up to him to illustrate his adequacy as such by means of a court
approved questionnaire. Of course, as with other analogous procedures in law, if the
court's initial determination is not challenged, then it would stand as being determined.
This procedure would safeguard the rights of absent class members by allowing the
decisive settlement of the issue.
100 See In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592 (M.D. Pa. 1974), where the court denied
19751
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V. CONCLUSION
Class actions can play a vital part in enforcing the law of today's com-
plex society although in recent years this vitality has apparently been ig-
nored by the federal judicial system. For a brief period of time the fed-
eral courts appeared to be applying Rule 23 liberally in order to adopt
appropriate remedies and redress many of the problems of our society.' 0'
Liberal use of class actions suddenly appeared to spark enforcement of
laws which were adopted more than a decade ago in the area of civil
rights.10 2 Big business began to comply with new consumer legislation,
primarily as a result of the threat of class actions which could subject
them to enormous liabilities.10 3  For example, it has been reported that
the threat of class actions was the major reason for the immediate com-
pliance of the business community with the Truth-In-Lending Act. 04
Since 1971, the federal courts have decisively retreated from the lib-
eral approach of allowing almost all suits to be certified as class actions.
The present restrictive view is in response to either the great increase in
the number of class action suits, the allegations of attorney abuse in
this area, 0 5 the result of a fear on the part of the courts to assume the
tremendous power the class action device gives them, 0 6 or a combination
of all of these factors. Because of the problems of class actions, the
courts are adopting rigid rules for narrowing and restricting the use of
the plaintiff class representative's motion for class certification without prejudice to
reinstitute until such time as the class representative could
affirmatively show, by affidavit or upon evidentiary hearing, preferably the
latter, that they alone or in conjunction with others will provide adequate
representation. Id. at 595.
See also Parish v. Boetel & Co., 60 F.R.D. 680, 681 (D. Neb. 1973), where the court
made a conditional finding of adequate representation pursuant to its authority under
Rule 23(c) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1o1 See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
102 This is especially true in the area of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Baxter v. Savannah
Sugar Refining Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ca. 1972), modified, 495 F.2d 437 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974).
,0" See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), where under the threat of a class action which, if successful, could have yielded
a recovery of about $13 million, the defendant, Chemical Bank of New York, im-
mediately made the disclosure of the nominal annual percentage rate demanded by the
plaintiff-class in compliance with the Truth-in-Lending Act. Id. at 415.
104 D. RoTHsCmD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION: REPORTING SERVICE, § 13.01
(1974). Rothschild states that:
The threat of class actions has been described as the major factor in gaining com-
pliance with the [Truth-in-Lending] Act among major United States creditors.
Id. at 244(o).
See also Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 309 F. Supp. 983, 986 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
105 See Comment, Ethical Obligations of the Attorney Under Rule 23 - Abuses and
Reforms, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 224 (1974). See also Annot., 16 A.L.R. FED. 883
(1973).
10 See Shaw v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566 (D.N.H. 1973), where the court seemed
fearful of ruling against the oil companies during the period of the fuel shortage.
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such actions. 0 7  The hours which have already been spent in litigating
class action issues should not be wasted by adopting a narrow inflexible
rule. The continuation of the case-by-case interpretation of subtle doc-
trines and standards must continue to keep the class action a living and
workable apparatus. Rule 23(b) (2) must not be shackled by a restric-
tive rule requiring expensive notice in all cases. Alternative procedural
safeguards can and should be used to provide adequate protection and as-
surance of adequate representation of the interests of the absent class
members.
GARY L. EBY
107 See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332 (1969). Unfortunately, the rest of the federal judiciary apparently felt that
the Supreme Court wanted to put an end to the liberal use of Rule 23. Thus the district
and circuit courts after these Supreme Court decisions began developing their own
restrictive and rigid rules against class actions. See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), where Judge Frankel interpreted
the class action procedures as inconsistent with the specific remedy that Congress
created in the Truth-in-Lending Act. Other courts have cited Ratner as prohibiting all
class actions under the Truth-in-Lending Act. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D.
189, 194 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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